This paper examines the effects of a shock to the stock-price formation process on the design of executive incentive contracts. We find that an exogenous removal of short-selling constraints causes firms to convexify compensation payoffs by granting relatively more stock options to their managers. We also find that treated firms adopt new anti-takeover provisions. These results suggest that when firms face the threat of bear raids, they incentivize managers to take actions that mitigate the adverse effects of unrestrained short selling. Overall, this paper provides causal evidence that financial markets affect incentive contract design.
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There is a growing literature in financial economics showing that stock prices can have a causal effect on real outcomes, such as firms' investment and financing decisions (Bond, Edmans, and Goldstein, [2012] ). However, this literature generally takes as exogenous the contract between shareholders and managers, even though principal-agent models predict that the stock-price formation process plays a central role in the design of managerial-incentive contracts (Holmstrom and Tirole, [1993] ). This paper fills this gap by examining how a shock to the informational environment in financial markets affects incentive contract design through its effects on the stock-price formation process.
Our analysis focuses on the removal of short-selling constraints because several theories predict that short sellers can affect the dynamics of stock prices and, as a consequence, the design of incentive contracts. In general, short-selling activity can alter the information content of market prices in two ways (see, e.g., Goldstein and Guembel, [2008] ).
First, the removal of short-selling constraints can improve stock price informativeness by incentivizing informed investors to trade on negative information (Diamond and Verrecchia, [1987] ). 1 In that case, since stock prices are more informative about agent's actions, standard principal-agent models predict that firms should rely more on stock prices in the compensation contract by increasing the provision of performance incentives (Holmstrom, [1979] , Holmstrom and Milgrom, [1987] , Holmstrom and Tirole, [1993] ). We label this prediction "the stock-price informativeness hypothesis."
Second, a decrease in short-sale costs can also incentivize uninformed speculators to artificially drive prices down. Bear raiders can cause a price decline by forcing investors holding marginable long positions to sell their shares through predatory trading (Brunnermeier and because recent studies show that this regulation caused a large exogenous increase in shortselling activity (SEC's OEA, [2007] , Alexander and Peterson [2008] , Diether, Lee, and Werner, [2009] , Grullon, Michenaud, and Weston, [2015] ). Therefore, it gives us a unique opportunity to investigate the effects of changes in the price formation process on the design of managerial incentive contracts.
Using a difference-in-differences (DiD) approach, we compare pilot and control firms reactions to Reg SHO to identify the causal effects of unrestrained short selling on the design of CEO incentives. Because firms can re-contract with their managers in multiple ways, we investigate several aspects of the incentive contract design. Our analysis begins with the examination of the provision of performance incentives and the convexity of the compensation payoffs. We find no evidence that pilot firms increase the provision of performance incentives, as measured by delta (i.e., the sensitivity of compensation to stock returns). On the other hand, using different measures of vega (i.e., the sensitivity of compensation to stock return volatility), we find that pilot firms increase the convexity of compensation payoffs.
We then explore the impact of Reg SHO on the structure of new equity grants, which includes stock options and restricted stocks. Our results indicate that the increase in vega comes from a change in the structure of new equity grants. Pilot firms increase the proportion of stock options by an average of 7% during the treatment period. Given that most of the new option awards had a relatively short vesting period, this change directly affected managerial incentives during the two-year period of the experiment. 5 The difference in the structure of new equity grants between the pilot and control firms persists over the duration of the experiment and disappears immediately following the repeal of the uptick rule for all firms in 2007.
Further analysis based on the dollar value of compensation and its components shows no change in the level of compensation or in the value of the equity grants, but a strong substitution effect between stock options and restricted stock awards: the pilot firms increased the use of stock options while simultaneously decreasing the use of restricted stocks. This substitution effect is observed both in terms of dollar value and in number of shares. We find only weak evidence that firms rely more on cash awards.
We also study non-pecuniary forms of incentive contracts and find that the pilot firms increased their E-index, or "Entrenchment-Index," a measure of managerial entrenchment based on anti-takeover provisions (Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell, [2009] ). One potential reason for the adoption of these provisions is that it reduces careers concerns by providing greater job security to the manager in the presence of external threats (Edmans, Goldstein, and Jiang, [2012] ).
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To further establish the channel of causation, we investigate changes in the contracting environment. First, we examine changes in a host of measures of price informativeness or efficiency that have been used in the market microstructure literature, in particular in Boehmer and Wu (2013) . Our proxies are: the probability of informed trading (PIN) (Easley, Hvidkjaer, and O'Hara, [2002] , Brown and Hillegeist, [2007] ), 1-R2 (Roll, [1988] ), the delay measure (Hou and Moskowitz, [2005] ), the relative informational efficiency of prices (Boehmer and Kelley, [2009] ), and the price-earnings announcement drift (Ball and Brown, [1968] ). For all these measures, we find no evidence that the removal of the uptick rule led to more informative or efficient prices.
Second, we find evidence that the pilot program affects proxies for bear-raid risk. We use option data to show that Reg SHO increased the volatility skew of the pilot firms' put options, 6 By decreasing stock prices (thereby making the target firm cheaper), short-selling activity can trigger a takeover. As shown by Edmans et al. (2012) , an exogenous shock to stock prices can have a significant impact on the likelihood of a takeover that could result in managerial job loss (Amihud and Lev, [1981] ).
but not of their call options, suggesting that investors anticipated larger negative jumps in stock prices for firms with unrestrained short selling. 7 These results are consistent with the bear-raid risk argument in Goldstein and Guembel (2008) and the predatory-trading argument in Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2005) . In these theories, lower barriers to short selling lead to an increase in left-tail risk. It is also consistent with the evidence in Henry and Koski (2010) that shows that short selling can be manipulative.
In general, our results are consistent with the main predictions from the short-selling threat hypothesis. As discussed above, because short selling can exacerbate the career concerns of managers who could then adopt sub-optimal policies, increasing the convexity of the compensation payoff can mitigate these concerns by reducing managerial exposure to downside risk and thus incentivizing managers to take risk (Holmstrom, [1999] ). 8 Further, by adopting new anti-takeover provisions, firms can incentivize managers to invest in firm-specific human-capital by protecting them from takeovers attempts triggered by bear raids (Jarrell and Poulsen, [1988] ).
Hence, the re-contracting practices that we observe suggest that when firms face the threat of bear raids, they incentivize managers to take actions that mitigate the adverse effects of unrestrained short selling.
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Furthermore, by relying more on stock option compensation and adopting more antitakeover provisions, firms can also offset the adverse feedback effects of manipulative short sales. As argued in Goldstein and Guembel (2008) , one way to reduce the profitability of 7 The volatility skew of puts (calls) has been shown to proxy for large expected negative (positive) jumps in individual stocks (Xing, Zhang and Zhao, [2010] ) and in indices (e.g., Bollen and Whaley, [2004] ). 8 In order to mitigate career concerns, Holmstrom states that "… the manager has to be given some stake in the real outcome if preferences are to be brought closer together. Giving him a share of the firm may not be the best strategy, however, since it carries both downside and upside risk. A stock option could be a more valuable incentive, since it removes the downside risk." 9 Further, firms might award more options to incentivize their managers to release more information in order to counter act the increase in noise due to the risk of price manipulation. Core (2001) discusses the possibility that stock options might increase the incentives for voluntary disclosures.
manipulative trading is by providing performance incentives, as well as by rewarding managers for investing. In their model, the adverse-feedback effect appears when managers learn from the market after an uninformative negative-order flow induced by bear raiders. Because a price decline reduces the delta of an option while keeping the delta of a restricted stock constant, compensation that relies more heavily on stock options reduces the sensitivity of compensation to performance conditional on a price decline. Consequently, by convexifying the compensation payoffs, pilot firms can counteract the adverse feedback effects by incentivizing managers to maximize firm value while paying less attention to the actions of short sellers (e.g., listening less to the market when there is a downward price pressure). 10 Finally, by adopting more antitakeover provisions, firms can incentivize managers to take on long-term projects that, because of price manipulation by bear raiders, might appear unprofitable in the short-run to an outsider (DeAngelo and Rice, [1983] , Stein, [1988] ).
Overall, these findings support the notion that firms perceive short sellers as a threat and go to great lengths to counter them, consistent with Lamont (2012) . Indeed, anecdotal evidence suggests that Reg SHO was a highly relevant and controversial event for both the CEOs of the affected firms, and the officials of the stock exchanges. In public comments, CEOs, NYSE officials, and specialists all opposed the removal of short-sale restrictions during the experiment.
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Contrary to the argument that firms mitigate concerns about the prospect of less compensation due to lower stock prices, we find no evidence that pilot firms move away from 10 See empirical evidence in Kau, Linck and Rubin (2008) who show that managers listen less to the market when the sensitivity of compensation to firm performance (i.e., delta) is lower. equity-based compensation. We also find no evidence supporting the idea that firms re-contract with their manager due to an increase in the informativeness of stock prices.
We perform a number of robustness tests. One concern is related to the potential mechanical effect of a decline in stock prices on the structure of equity grants. 12 We re-run our analysis using the number of options and stocks (instead of their grant value) and show that our results are not mechanically driven by changes in stock and option prices. Another alternative explanation is that powerful CEOs are able to demand more favorable incentive contracts by leveraging the presence of short sellers. However, we do not find evidence supporting this argument. Finally, given the randomized nature of the experiment, neither selection bias, nor, by extension, endogeneity, should be an issue. Nevertheless, we ascertain whether our findings are the result of chance by randomizing the inclusion of firms in the pilot group. Out of 5,000
simulations, we do not find a single instance in which all of our main variables experience similar or higher T-statistics than the ones we find in our treated sample.
Overall, our study contributes to the literature linking financial markets to corporate decisions. Chen, Goldstein and Jiang (2007) and Edmans et al. (2012) show that financial markets influence investment policy and takeovers. More closely related to our work, Grullon et al. (2015) , Li and Zhang (2015) , and Fang, Huang, and Karpoff (2016) find effects of short selling on investment and financing policies, management forecasts, and earnings management, respectively. Our study complements this growing literature by being the first one, to the best of our knowledge, to relate short selling to the design of incentive contracts.
12 The long-run price and investment effects documented in Grullon et al. (2015) are not present in our sample. Because we require ExecuComp data, our sample firms are much larger. Hence, one potential explanation is that larger firms are more sophisticated and are thus more likely to re-contract with their managers in an efficient way. In that case, this re-contracting practice would offset the effect documented among small firms in Grullon et al. Our findings also highlight the importance of financial markets in corporate governance mechanisms, as suggested in Holmstrom and Tirole (1993) . They also complement the results in Jayaraman and Milbourn (2011) , who find a relation between stock liquidity and the provision of performance incentives. Our results call for more theoretical work that endogenizes incentive contracts when stock markets affect real outcomes. See Lin, Liu, and Sun (2015) for recent work toward that direction.
Our paper also contributes to the literature on executive incentives. We provide evidence that firms move quickly to adjust executive incentives following a shock to the environment. We thus complement the findings in Hayes, Lemmon, and Qiu (2012) , who show that firms adjusted compensation packages after the adoption of FAS 123R. Recently, Gormley, Matsa and Milbourn (2013) document the fact that firms decrease the convexity of new equity grants after a shock to liability risk. In contrast, we find that a shock to bear-raid risk that is exogenous to growth opportunities leads to an increase in the convexity of executives' new equity grants.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section I describes our data and main variables. Section II discusses our identification strategy and examines how firms adjust their executive incentives in response to an exogenous shock to short-selling activity. Section III examines changes in the contracting environment. Section IV presents robustness tests. Section V concludes.
I. Sample, Data, and Variable Definitions
We use the official membership list of firms included in the Russell 3000 index as of Our main variables of interest are measures of performance incentive provision, the convexity of compensation payoffs, the structure of compensation, and anti-takeover provisions.
To compute our incentive and compensation variables, we use data from ExecuComp. Following the literature, we use delta (i.e. the sensitivity of compensation to stock return) to proxy for the level of performance incentives provided by the firm (e.g., Coles et al, [2006] , Hayes et al., [2012] ). Delta is defined as the sum of the number of restricted stocks, which has a delta of one, and the number of granted stock options times their Black-Scholes delta.
To proxy for the convexity of compensation payoffs, we use vega, which is the sensitivity of compensation to stock return volatility (Guay, [1999] , Gormley et al., [2013] ). We calculate vega by multiplying the number of granted stock options by their Black-Scholes vega.
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Following Dittmann, Yu, and Zhang (2015) , we also use the ratio of vega to delta. This measure 13 We assume that the vega of a stock is negligible and close to zero. This is a standard practice in the literature. Guay (1999) uses vega as a measure of the convexity of the compensation payoff and shows that the vega associated with stock options is considerably larger than the vega associated with restricted stock. As a result, subsequent studies such as Knopf et al. (2002) and Coles et al. (2006) approximate the total vega of CEOs' stock and option portfolios by the vega of their option portfolio. However, recently, Anderson and Core (2016) call into question this practice by noting, for example, that the sensitivity of manager's debt is important in identifying risk-taking incentives.
captures the risk-return tradeoff faced by managers when they undertake a project. For example, high vega compensation might induce a manager to accept a risky negative NPV project, but high delta compensation could offset this effect by incentivizing the manager to reject the project. 14 The scaling by delta is important because it captures this offsetting effect.
To compute delta and vega, we use two approaches for estimating the expected volatility of the underlying asset. Following Habib and Ljungqvist (2005) , we estimate the annualized volatility over the 250 trading days in the preceding fiscal year, and for observations with missing data in the preceding fiscal year, we substitute data from the current fiscal year. In the second approach, we use the 2003 annual volatility (i.e. pre-treatment) computed over the prior 36 months, to control for potential effects of the Reg SHO experiment on the distribution of returns of the underlying asset. We use the dividend yield in the prior year as the expected dividend yield.
We employ several variables to capture information about how firms contract with their CEOs. Total compensation is based on total direct compensation (tdc1), whereas total equity compensation is the sum of stock option awards and restricted stock awards. Because we are particularly interested in the design of the equity grant, we employ two different measures that capture the portion of stock options in new equity awards (i.e. stock option awards scaled by the sum of option and stock awards). The first uses the grant-date dollar value of the awards to compute the ratio of option to total equity awards. This measure is similar to the one employed in Kadan and Swinkels (2008) . The second computes the ratio by using the number of stock options and restricted stocks awarded to the CEO. We use this last measure to verify that our results are 14 See also Ross (2004) , who shows that a convex compensation payoff does not necessarily offer greater risk-taking incentives, which depends on the agent's utility function. See also Carpenter (2000) . However, several empirical studies find evidence that stock option compensation leads to risk-taking behavior (see, e.g., Coles, [2006] , Chava and Purnanandam, [2010] , Chang, Fu, Low, and Zhang, [2015] , and Bakke, Mahmudi, Fernando and Salas, [2016] ).
not mechanically driven by a relative change in the stock price of pilot firms relative to control firms. This measure is similar to the one employed in Dittmann, Maug and Spalt (2010) . Finally, we also examine the components of compensation separately, including stock options, restricted stocks, cash bonus, and base salary.
We also gather information on firms' anti-takeover provisions from the Risk Metrics database. Following Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell (2009) , we construct the E-index, a measure of managerial entrenchment based on anti-takeover provisions. This index represents the sum of the presence of the following 6 provisions: a staggered board; limits to amending bylaws; limits to amending charters; supermajorities; golden parachutes; and poison pills.
We provide more information about the definition of these variables, along with all the other variables used in the paper, in Appendix 1. To limit the effects of outliers, we winsorize all our unbounded variables at the 1% level in both tails. Due to the skewness in the distribution of the non-ratio compensation variables, we use their natural log transformation of one plus their value. Table I provides summary statistics for all the firms in the sample in fiscal year 2004 (i.e., the pre-treatment year), with a breakdown between pilot and control firms. We find no differences between the two groups, suggesting that our filtering process does not create any obvious sample selection biases. Both groups of firms are about the same size, have similar compensation levels, equity grants structures, governance characteristics, and capital structures.
None of the differences in characteristics are statistically significant. Therefore, the data support the hypothesis that the pilot firms in our sample represent a random draw from our overall sample.
{Insert Table I here}
II. Regulation SHO and Changes in Managerial Incentive Contracts
On July 28, 2004, the SEC announced the removal of restrictions on short sales for a randomly selected sample from the Russell 3000 index. The SEC selected firms from the Russell 3000 index listed on NYSE, NASDAQ and AMEX and ranked them separately for each stock exchange by average daily traded volume. In each stock exchange, the SEC put every third stock in the pilot program. The rationale for this stratified randomization was to ensure representation from the three stock exchanges, and to get a consistent average trading volume between pilot and control firms in each stock exchange. The objective of the pilot study was to test the impact of removing short sales restrictions induced by the uptick rule on stock market volatility, liquidity, and price efficiency. Figure 1 provides a detailed timeline of the experiment. 15 Previous literature documents an economically significant increase in short-selling activity of about 11%
around the announcement date (Grullon et al., [2015] ) and of 4 to 8% around the implementation date of Reg SHO (SEC's OEA, [2007] , Diether et al., [2009] ). Note that even in the absence of any effect on short-selling activity, firms may want to redesign CEO compensation contracts if their CEOs perceive stock price informativeness or bear-raid risk to be higher as a result of unrestrained short selling.
{Insert Figure 1 here}
A. Methodology
Our empirical strategy relies on the exogenous shock created by the announcement on anytime between the announcement date and up to 12 months afterward. 16 We consider other timing classifications in the robustness tests section and reach similar conclusions. Shue and Townsend (2014) show that there are cycles in equity grant practices and that the vast majority of these cycles are based on a two-year period. To control for this cyclicality,
we therefore use two-year period dummies in our specifications. We also include period fiscal Since there is no difference in short-selling constraints between the two groups, we expect no difference in the outcome variables at that time relative to the baseline period.
Our main specification is as follows:
where Y is the dependent variable of interest, and Pilot is a dummy variable, indicating whether the firm is in the pilot group. The standard errors are clustered at the firm-level. To control for time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity during the tenure of a given CEO, we also estimate our main specification including CEO-firm fixed effects.
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The main coefficient of interest is 3 , which is the coefficient of the treatment effect (or the difference-in-differences coefficient). relative to the baseline period.
B. The Effects of the Experiment on the Provision of Performance Incentives to the CEO and the Convexity of the Compensation Payoffs
Our first set of tests examines how the removal of short-selling constraints affects the provision of performance incentives and the convexity of compensation payoffs. If the stock price informativeness effects are stronger (weaker) than the bear-raid effects, then we should observe an increase in delta (vega) after the removal of short-selling constraints. The results are reported in Table II. {Insert Table II here} We find no evidence that the removal of short-selling constraints causes a change in the provision of performance incentives. Across all specifications, we find no change in delta. The coefficient for Year 2005-06*Pilot is economically and statistically insignificant in all our specifications. These results are inconsistent with the predictions of the stock price informativeness hypothesis. On the other hand, consistent with the short-selling threat hypothesis, we find a significant increase in the convexity of compensation payoffs. The coefficient for Year 2005-06*Pilot is positive and significant in all our specifications and across both measures of convexity (LogVega and Vega/Delta). In terms of economic significance, our evidence indicates that log vega increased by 8.0% relative to the pre-treatment mean, which is similar to the magnitudes found in Hayes et al. (2012) .
It is important to note that there is no pre-treatment effect for the delta and vega measures. The coefficient for Pilot is insignificant in all of the specifications. In addition, we also find no difference in the period before the control period. The coefficient for Year 2001-02*Pilot is insignificant in all the specifications for the three dependent variables. This lends support to our identifying assumption that there are no differences between the two groups in the pre-treatment period. Finally, most of our evidence indicates that this difference disappears at the repeal of the experiment, which is consistent with the differential treatment effect disappearing after the removal of the uptick rule for all firms.
In general, our results show that pilot firms increase the convexity of compensation payoffs during the experiment. In the next section, we investigate the source of this change by studying the structure of the equity grants awarded to the CEO.
C. The Effects of the Experiment on the Structure of New Equity Grants awarded to the CEO
The existing literature uses stock options awards to capture the convexity of the compensation payoff (see, e.g., Hayes et al, [2012] ). We study the change of convexity in the compensation contract by examining the trade-off between awarding stock options versus restricted stocks in new CEO equity grants, which allows us to test the predictions based on the career concerns arguments presented in Holmstrom (1999). All else being equal, granting more stock options relative to restricted stock in new equity grants will lead to higher convexity in the compensation payoff and lower managerial exposure to downside risk, which should give incentives to the CEO to undertake risky projects (Holmstrom, [1999] ).
Our main measure of interest is the portion of options in new equity awards (i.e. option awards scaled by the sum of option and stock awards). We use two different dependent variables to measure this. The first is the ratio of the value of stock options granted to the CEO to the total value of equity grants (Option/Equity ($)), and the second is the ratio of the number of stock options granted to the CEO to the sum of the number of stock options and restricted stocks awarded (Option/Equity (#)). We use three different regression specifications: OLS, the CEOfirm fixed-effect, and Tobit regressions (left censored at 0 and right censored at 1). The results are reported in Table III. {Insert Table III here} We find evidence that the experiment causes firms to rely more on stock options in their equity grants. The coefficient for Year 2005-06*Pilot is positive and significant across all specifications and in both samples (Panels A and B). 18 In terms of economic significance, our evidence indicates that the ratio of options to equity increased by 7.5% relative to the pretreatment mean, which is similar to the magnitudes found in Kadan and Swinkels (2008) .
We find that the difference in the equity grant structure between pilot and control firms is These results confirm that the pilot firms used more stock options during the treatment period, and that this difference disappeared at the end of the experiment around the time of the repeal of the uptick rule for all US stocks. 18 As described in Puhani (2012) , the interacted term Year 2005-06*Pilot in the Tobit regression correctly identifies the sign of the treatment effect in a difference-in-differences model, even though Tobit is a non-linear model.
It is important to note that we find similar results across both our measures of structure of equity grants (Option/Equity ($) and Option/Equity (#)). This confirms that we capture a change in contracting behavior that is not driven by changes in stock prices.
We find that the coefficient of Pilot is not significant in all specifications. This confirms the assumption that there is no pre-treatment effect for pilot firms, and that pilot and control firms exhibit similar equity grant structures before exposure to the treatment. We also find no We also illustrate graphically the evolution of the structure of CEO equity grants for firms in the pilot group and in the control group over time in Figure 2 . We report the evolution for both the full sample and the balanced sample (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) . Panels A and B depict the difference in the average ratio of the value of stock options granted to the total value of equity grants between pilot and control firms during the period 2001 to 2008. Consistent with the previous analysis, we observe that before the start of the experiment, the difference in the structure of new equity grants between the two groups is very small and statistically insignificant. This difference significantly increases during the experiment, while it decreases after the repeal of the uptick rule for all US firms in 2007.
{Insert Figure 2 here}
In Panel C and D we plot the difference-in-differences of the structure of new CEO equity grants between pilot firms and control firms over the same period. The difference-indifferences (DiD) measures the change in the difference of the ratio of stock options granted to total equity grants (in value and in number of shares) between pilot and control firms from period t-1 to period t. These panels show that there are almost no changes in the difference of the structure of new equity grants between the two groups during the pre-treatment period, but a sharp increase during the experiment, consistent with the evidence presented in our previous analysis.
D. The Effects of the Experiment on Total CEO Compensation and the Value of Equity Grants
In this section, we examine the effect of the removal of short-selling constraints on total CEO compensation and on the value of equity grants. According to the short-selling threat hypothesis, it is possible that CEOs might ask for higher wages to compensate for the increase in bear raid risk. It is also possible that firms would increase the value of the equity grants awarded to CEOs, as way of increasing their exposure to stock prices if stock price informativeness is improved. The results are reported in Table IV. {Insert Table IV here} We find no evidence that the experiment affected total CEO compensation or the value of the equity grants. The coefficient for Year 2005-06*Pilot is insignificant in all our specifications for both dependent variables (LogTDC and LogEQ).
We note that the coefficient for 2001-02*Pilot is significant when examining LogTDC in the full sample (Panel A) , which suggests a difference in total CEO compensation between the two groups in the two-year period before the control period. However, this difference disappears in the balanced sample (Panel B) , which shows that the difference in the full sample is likely to be due to a change in sample composition during the 4 years prior to the treatment.
E. The Effects of the Experiment on the Components of CEO Compensation
In this section, we investigate the effect of the removal of short-selling constraints on the main components of CEO compensation. In particular, we examine the change in the value of options awards (LogOption($)), stock awards (LogStock($)), cash bonuses (LogBonus($)) and base salaries (LogSalary($)). We also study the change in the number of stock options (LogOption(#)) and restricted stocks (LogStock(#)) awarded to the CEO. The results are reported in Table V. {Insert Table V here} The results confirm the analysis in the structure of equity grants. We find that the treatment causes a significant increase in the value of option awards and a significant decrease in the value of restricted stock awards. Interestingly, the absolute magnitudes of the coefficient of the treatment effect (Year 2005-06*Pilot) are similar, indicating a substitution effect between restricted stock and stock options. This substitution effect is also confirmed when examining the number of stock options and restricted stocks awarded to the CEO. Overall, these results are consistent with our results on the structure and value of the equity grants. Firms do not simply give more stock options; they substitute away from restricted stock toward stock options. Hence they maintain the same expected compensation cost, but change the structure of the equity grant to increase the convexity of the compensation payoff, which is consistent with the short-selling threat hypothesis.
We find no change in base salaries. While we find that the pilot firms relied more on cash bonuses during the treatment, this evidence is relatively weak. The coefficient of the treatment effect (Year 2005-06*Pilot) is significant at the 10% level in the CEO-firm fixed specification but not in the OLS specification. The direction of this last result is inconsistent with the stockprice informativeness hypothesis. If informativeness increases, firms should rely more on stock price performance in their compensation contracts and potentially less on cash compensation, which is often associated with accounting performance measures (Murphy, [1999] ). On the other hand, this result can be rationalized under the short-selling threat hypothesis. If stock prices can be more easily manipulated by short-sellers, firms might want to move away from stock price performance measures and rely more on accounting performance in the compensation contract.
As we do not find a decrease in the value of the equity grants, or a decrease in delta, however, we believe this argument to be at best only suggestive.
F. The Effects of the Experiment on Classified Board and the Entrenchment Index
We also study changes in non-pecuniary forms of incentives in response to the implementation of Reg SHO. More precisely, we investigate changes in the provision of antitakeover provisions. For this, we examine the E-Index. The results are reported in Table VI. {Insert Table VI here} Our results indicate that the pilot firms are more likely to increase their E-index. We note that the power of our tests is lower here, because we observe the governance data only every other year. This finding is consistent with the short-selling threat hypothesis. Our results suggest that firms adopt more anti-takeover provisions in order to reduce the career concerns of the CEO due to the increased likelihood of bear raids.
III. Changes in the Contractual Environment
In this section, we examine the impact of Reg SHO on the contractual environment to determine the channel(s) through which short-selling activity affects compensation contracts. We focus on two dimensions: stock price informativeness and bear-raid risk.
A. The Effects of the Experiment on Stock Price Informativeness
To study the effect of Reg SHO on stock price informativeness, we first use two measures often used in corporate finance studies, namely 1-R 2 (Roll, [1988] ), and the probability of informed trading (PIN) (Easley, Hvidkjaer, and O'Hara, [2002] ). Table VII. {Insert Table VII here} Overall, our results do not support the hypothesis that unrestrained short selling due to the removal of the uptick rule improves stock price informativeness/efficiency. The coefficient for Treatment Period*Pilot is significant and negative for the PIN measure, but it is insignificant for the other four measures. This result can be consistent with the short-selling threat hypothesis because manipulation by short-sellers can increase the noise in the price formation process.
Finally, we investigate the change in price earnings announcement drift (Ball and Brown, [1968] Our results are different from those in the literature because the treatment and pretreatment periods are different from other papers that have used this experiment to look at the effects of short-selling constraints (e.g., Boehmer and Wu, [2013] ). 20 In this paper, we define the treatment as having started when the names of the firms put into the pilot group are first announced, while previous literature defines the treatment start date with the actual removal of the uptick rule. Our stance is in line with the theoretical arguments in Allen, Morris, and Postlewaite (1993) and Scheinkman and Xiong (2003) , who show that rational short sellers should implement trading strategies in anticipation of the removal of the short-selling constraints. 21, 22 Based on backward induction, it is optimal for short sellers to trade as if the constraint is removed even before the actual removal, because traders know which firms will see their constraints removed and which firms will not. Taken together, these theories suggest that short-sellers and existing shareholders of the firms in the pilot group are likely to sell their stocks more aggressively when these firms are subject to negative news, even before the implementation of the pilot test. Increased short selling is rational as long as the benefits 20 See, e.g., Arnold, Butler, Crack, and Zhang (2005) for early evidence on the information content of short selling. 21 Allen et al (1993) show that stock price bubbles may arise if investors face short sale constraints either now or in the future, in spite of all agents being rational and fully informed about future dividends. In their model, it is the belief that investors will be able to sell the stock at a high price in the future that causes the bubble. In this setting, the announcement of the removal of short-selling constraints in the future should immediately lead to an increase in selling activity by existing shareholders and possibly short sellers, because investors realize that they will not be able to sell the stocks at inflated prices to other investors in the future. 22 Scheinkman and Xiong (2003) show that stock prices should incorporate the option value of reselling to optimistic investors in the presence of short-selling constraints. The expected removal of short-selling constraints should therefore lead to an increase in selling and short-selling activity after the announcement.
outweigh the costs of short selling the stocks that are still subject to the uptick rule. Consistent with this argument, Grullon et al. (2015) find that short interest, a measure of long-term shortselling positions, increases around the announcement of the pilot program on July 28, 2004.
B. The Effects of the Experiment on Bear-Raid Risk
The Reg SHO experiment might have increased the incentives to bear raiders to manipulate the value of the pilot firms (Goldstein and Guembel, [2008] ). If this hypothesis is true, then one would expect measures of left-tail risk to increase during the post-announcement period of the Reg SHO experiment. To test this hypothesis, we examine the impact of Reg SHO on the volatility skew of options to determine whether the options markets anticipate the effects of the removal of short-sales constraints. 23 We examine changes in the volatility skew of put and call options because these measures have been shown to proxy for large expected negative (positive) jumps in individual stocks (Xing, Zhang, and Zhao, [2010] ) as well as in indices (Bollen and Whaley, [2004] , Bates,
[2003], and Gârleanu, Pedersen, and Poteshman, [2009] ). We define the volatility skew of the put options as the difference between the implied volatility of out-of-the-money put options (strike price to stock price ratio between 0.7 and 0.9) and at-the-money put options (strike price to stock price ratio between 0.95 and 1.05). 24 The volatility skew of call options is the difference between the implied volatility of out-of-the-money call options (strike price to stock price ratio between 1.1 and 1.3) and at-the-money call options (strike price to stock price ratio between 0.95 and 1.05). 23 In an untabulated analysis, we also replicate Grullon, et al. (2015) in our sample of larger firms and find that the pilot firms exhibited more negative returns on bad-market days but that there was no effect on good-market days. This evidence is consistent with stock prices of the pilot firms becoming more sensitive to bad news. 24 We define volatility skew as the difference between the implied volatility of out-of-the-money put (call) options and that of at-the-money put (call) options following Xing et al. (2010) , except that we separate out the negative and positive components of volatility skew.
{Insert Table VIII here} Our estimation window covers the one-month period before and after July 28, 2004.
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The volatility-skew of puts captures the anticipation of large negative jumps in prices. The statistical tests in Panel A of Table VIII show that the increase in the volatility skew of the puts is significant. We also perform the same exercise using call options (see Panel B of Table VIII) and find no significant changes in the difference of volatility skew between the two groups.
These results confirm that the change in the risk profile of the firm is asymmetric: only the lefttail component of equity risk is affected by the relaxation of short-selling constraints.
The removal of short-sales constraints may have improved the incorporation of negative information into stock prices for the pilot firms. However, our finding that the volatility skew of pilot firms' put options (a predictor of crashes, see e.g., Xing et al., [2010] , and Bollen and
Whaley, [2004] ) increases around the announcement of Reg SHO is inconsistent with the prediction of Hong and Stein (2003) . According to their model, the likelihood of market crashes declines with short selling, as stock prices incorporate negative information faster. Our findings are, however, consistent with Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2005) and Goldstein and Guembel (2008) , who show that bear raiders can drive prices down through predatory trading and feedback effects, respectively. 25 Due to data limitations, we use a restricted subsample of firms that have options traded on the options market with a strictly positive trading volume. Only 490 such firms (pilot and control) meet our requirements, resulting in a sample that is about one third of the size of our original sample.
IV. Robustness Tests

A. Timing of the Equity Grants
We examine whether our results are also robust to a different classification of the treatment period. In our empirical framework, we assume that the decision regarding the structure of the equity awards is made at the beginning of the fiscal year (see, e.g., Core and Guay, [1999] ), but as the Reg SHO experiment was announced on July 28, 2004, it is possible that some firms determine their 2004 compensation policies after the announcement. This potential measurement error might reduce our ability to find a significant effect of the regulation or reduce the economic magnitude of the impact of Reg SHO on the change in the equity grant structure. To address this concern, we re-run our main regressions using three alternative specifications: one using only firms with fiscal-year month endings after the month of July, another one excluding fiscal year 2004, and a third one using 2001-2002 as the baseline period.
We reach similar conclusions based on the results from these alternative specifications.
B. Alternative Explanations
An alternative explanation for our results is that powerful CEOs are able to demand more favorable incentive contracts by leveraging the presence of short sellers. First, this agency argument is at odds with our finding that firms re-contract with their managers by changing the structure of the equity grant without increasing total compensation. Second, if this argument is true, one would expect firms with entrenched managers to react more aggressively to the Reg SHO experiment. Using the E-index in 2004 (pre-treatment year) as a proxy for managerial entrenchment, we test this hypothesis and find no significant differences in the reaction to Reg SHO between firms with high and low E-indices.
Another potential explanation is that firms may switch from restricted stock to stock options in order to manipulate basic earnings per share (EPS). We note that this effect is likely to be trivial for most firms in our sample because the number of restricted stocks distributed to the managers is very small relative to the number of shares outstanding. We gauge this potential effect by examining the difference in the ratio of income to common shares outstanding computed with and without the number of restricted stocks awards to the CEO. The difference between these two measures is statistically zero (t-stat=0.08).
C. Randomization
Our final robustness test is related to the randomized nature of our experimental framework. As mentioned earlier, endogeneity is unlikely to be an issue since firms cannot have caused their inclusion in the pilot program. Nevertheless, we test whether our results could have been the result of chance. We randomize the inclusion of firms in the pilot group and bootstrap an empirical distribution of our main results. Using an empirical distribution from 5,000
simulations, we cannot find a single sample exhibiting a joint increase in Log Vega, Vega/Delta, Option to Equity ($) and E-index that exhibits similar or higher T-statistics than the ones we find in our treated sample. Thus, it is unlikely that the results we document are generated by methodology choices or sample selection.
V. Conclusion
Our paper provides causal evidence that financial markets can have a significant effect on incentive contract design. Using an experiment that relaxes short-selling constraints on a random sample of US stocks (Reg SHO), we investigate whether short-selling threats affect the design of CEO incentives. We find evidence that Reg SHO causes pilot firms to increase the convexity of the compensation payoff. Firms do this by substituting away from restricted stock toward stock options in their new equity grants. Our evidence also shows that firms adopt new anti-takeover provisions during the experiment, and that proxies for left-tail risk spike around the announcement of Reg SHO.
These results indicate that treated firms re-contract with their managers to mitigate the adverse effects of unrestrained short selling. One rationale for these changes is to incentivize managers to avoid under-investing in risky projects and/or firm-specific human capital. Another rationale is to incentivize managers to pay less attention to the market when stock prices decline.
Overall, our results are consistent with the notion that firms perceive short sellers as a threat.
This paper makes several contributions to the literature. First, it provides evidence that firms move surprisingly quickly to adjust executive incentives following a shock to the environment. Furthermore, by using a unique randomized experiment, we are able to draw causal inferences regarding the effect of a change in firm's environment on executive compensation design, which has been a challenging issue in the compensation literature. Finally, to the best of our knowledge, it is the first study to show a causal effect of short selling on incentive contract design.
Our evidence also highlights the importance of endogenizing incentive contracts in models that examine how stock markets affect real outcomes. We believe that future theoretical work examining this issue could generate important new insights on how firms interact with their information environment.
Appendix 1 Definition of the Main Variables
Appendix 1 describes the main variables. Note that all logged variables are defined as the natural logarithm of one plus the value of the variable of interest. For example, LogTDC is defined as the natural logarithm of one plus CEO total direct compensation (TDC).
Variable Name Description
1-R 2
One minus the yearly R 2 from regressing firm stock returns on market and industry index returns (Roll (1988)) ar30 Absolute value of the thirty-minute quote midpoint return autocorrelation (Boehmer and Kelley, 2009) 
Bonus
CEO annual cash bonus (bonus)
Delay
Monthly price delay (Boehmer and Kelley, 2009 ). The measure is estimated in a similar fashion as the annual price delay in Hou and Moskowitz (2005) .
Delta
Total Black-Scholes Delta of the equity awards granted in the fiscal year. This is defined as (the sum of Black-Scholes Delta of all options awards plus the number of shares in restricted stock awards granted in the fiscal year) x 0.01 x fiscal year end price.
The Black-Scholes Delta of an option equals:
X is the strike price, S is the fiscal year-end stock price, N(.) is the cumulative normal function, q is ln(1+past year dividend yield); T is 0.7 x time to maturity of the option, with an upper bound at 10 years; rf is the treasury bond yield with a maturity of T; σ is the annualized stock return volatility using daily returns over the 250 trading days in the prior fiscal year (use concurrent fiscal year if missing). We follow Hayes et al. (2012) to retrieve the maturity of the option grant in the post 2006 period. We also assume that the grant date is July of that year. When the option maturity is missing, we assume it is equal to 9.5 years. We set it to 0.001 if it equals to zero.
Eindex
A measure of managerial entrenchment based on anti-takeover provisions (Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell, 2009) . It is the sum of the presence of the following 6 anti-takeover provisions: staggered board; limits to amend bylaws; limits to amend charter; supermajority; golden parachutes; and poison pill.
EQ
Total value of equity grants (Options($) + Stock($))
Leverage Long term debt (DLTT) plus debt in current liabilities (DLC) scaled by the sum of long term debt, debt in current liabilities, and total stockholders' equity (SEQ) x 100
Total Assets Book value of total assets (AT) (in million USD)
M/B
Market value of equity (PRCC x CSHO) plus book value of assets minus book value of equity (AT-CEQ), scaled by book value of total assets (AT)
Options($)
The value of stock options granted to the CEO (Execucomp -before 2006: option_awards_blk_value -starting 2006: option_awards_fv)
Options(#)
The number of stock options granted to the CEO (option_awards_num)
Variable Name Description
Options/Equity($) Ratio of the value of stock options granted to the total value of equity grants in % (100 x
Options($) / (Options($) + Stock($))
Options/Equity(#) Ratio of the number of stock options granted to the total number of stock options and shares of restricted stock granted in% ( 
Salary
CEO base salary (salary)
Sigma1
The ratio of standard deviation of the discrepancies between log transaction price and the efficient price based on Hasbrouck (1993) to the standard deviation of intraday transaction prices (Boehmer and Kelley, 2009) .
Treatment Years Dummy variable equal to 1 if fiscal year is 2005 or 2006
Vega Total Black-Scholes Vega of the equity awards granted in the fiscal year. This is defined as (the sum of Black-Scholes Vega of all options awards granted in the fiscal year) x 0.01.
The Black-Scholes Vega of an option equals:
exp(-q*T)*N'(d1)*S*sqrt(T)
where d1 equals [ln(S/X) + T*(rf-q+(σ^2/2))] / [σ *sqrt(T)], and N'(.) is the normal density function. See Delta description for a definition of the other parameters.
Vega/Delta
Ratio of Vega to Delta in % (100 x Vega / Delta)
Volatility Skew on Call Options
The difference between the implied volatility of out-of-the-money calls (strike price to stock price ratio is more than 1.1 and less than 1.3) and at-the-money calls (strike price to stock price ratio is less than 1.05 and more than .95).
Volatility Skew on Put Options
The difference between the implied volatility of out-of-the-money puts (strike price to stock price ratio is less than .9 and more than .7) and at-the-money puts (strike price to stock price ratio is less than 1.05 and more than .95). 
Table II The Effects of the Experiment on the Provision of Performance Incentives to the CEO and the Convexity of Compensation Payoffs
This table shows results of OLS and CEO-firm fixed-effect (FE) regressions. The sample period is fiscal year 2001 to 2008. The measure of performance incentive provision is Delta, which is the change in value of annual equity-based compensation for a 1% change in stock price. The first measure of the convexity of the compensation payoffs is Vega, which is the change in value of annual equity-based compensation for a 0.01 change in stock price volatility. The second measure is the ratio of Vega to Delta (Dittmann, Yu, and Zhang, 2015) . Pilot is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the company is in the Pilot Group of REG SHO. The coefficient of the treatment effect is in bold. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level. T-statistics are reported in parenthesis. c , b , a indicate a significance level of less than 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. The R 2 for the FE specification is the within R 2 . The dependent variables are the ratio of the value of stock options granted to the CEO to the total value of equity grants (Option/Equity ($)), and the ratio of the number of stock options granted to the total number of stock options and shares of restricted stock granted to the CEO (Option/Equity (#)). Pilot is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the company is in the Pilot Group of REG SHO. The coefficient of the treatment effect is in bold. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level. T-statistics are reported in parenthesis. c , b , a indicate a significance level of less than 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. The R 2 for the FE specification is the within R 2 . The R 2 for the Tobit specification is the Pseudo R 2 . (Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell, 2009) . Pilot is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the company is in the Pilot Group of REG SHO. The coefficient of the treatment effect is in bold. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level. Tstatistics are reported in parenthesis. c , b , a indicate a significance level of less than 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. The R 2 for the FE specification is the within R 2 . (Roll, [1988] ), and the probability of informed trading (PIN) (Easley, Hvidkjaer, and O'Hara, [2002] ), delay measure (Hou and Moskowitz, [2005] ), sigma1 and ar30 (Boehmer and Kelley, [2009] ). In column (1) and (2) the treatment period is 2005 and the control period is 2003. In column (3) to (5), the treatment period is the two year period after the announcement (i.e., 28jul2004-27jul2006), and the control period is the two year period before the announcement (i.e., 28jul2002-27jul2004). In Panel B, we provide change in price earnings announcement drift (Ball and Brown, [1968] ). We use three different cumulative abnormal return (car) window: -1,+1, +2,+6, and +2,+11. In Panel B, the treatment period is the two year period after the announcement (i.e., 28jul2004-27jul2006), and the control period is the two year period before the announcement (i.e., 28jul2002-27jul2004). Pilot is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the company is in the Pilot Group of REG SHO. quart_sue3 is a dummy variable indicating the quartile of the level of earnings surprise (e.g., quart_sue3=4 indicates the quartile for the highest positive earnings surprise). Standard errors are clustered at the firm-level in specification (1) and (2) (4) and (5) Figure 2 compares the evolution of the difference in the structure of CEO new equity grants measured by the ratio of stock options granted to total equity grants (in value and in number of shares) between firms in the pilot group and in the control group. Panel A and B plot the difference in this ratio between the pilot firms and the control firms. Panel C and D plot the change in the difference in this ratio from the previous two-year period. 
